122897
PTDC/MAT/122897/2010
FCT - Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, I.P.
Portugal
3599-PPCDT
50,000.00 €
2012-01-01
2014-12-31
Many problems in nature can be conveniently framed as a problem of evolution of collective cooperative behaviour, often modelled resorting to the tools of evolutionary game theory in well-mixed populations, combined with an appropriate N-person dilemma. Yet, the well-mixed assumption fails to describe the population dynamics whenever individuals have a say in deciding which groups they will participate. Here we...
The conundrum of cooperation has received increasing attention during the last decade. In this quest, the role of altruistic punishment has been identified as a mechanism promoting cooperation. Here we investigate the role of altruistic punishment on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation in structured populations exhibiting connectivity patterns recently identified as key elements of social networks. We ...
We explore the relation between the local fractal dimension and the development of the built-up area of the Northern Margin of the Metropolitan Area of Lisbon (NMAL), for the period between 1960 and 2004. To this end we make use of a Generalized Local Spatial Entropy (GLSE) function based on which urban areas can be classified into five different types. Our analysis of NMAL shows how some of the growth dynamics...
Social networks pervade our everyday lives: we interact, influence, and are influenced by our friends and acquaintances. With the advent of the World Wide Web, large amounts of data on social networks have become available, allowing the quantitative analysis of the distribution of information on them, including behavioral traits and fads. Recent studies of correlations among members of a social network, who exh...
Many problems of cooperation involve repeated interactions among the same groups of individuals. When collective action is at stake, groups often engage in Public Goods Games (PGG), where individuals contribute (or not) to a common pool, subsequently sharing the resources. Such scenarios of repeated group interactions materialize situations in which direct reciprocation to groups may be at work. Here we study d...
[Excerpt] Maria R. D'Orsogna and Matjaž Perc [1] summarize, in this review, a growing body of research that applies mathematical methods, some of which originating in statistical physics, to the understanding of the emergence and diffusion of crime. As they state, our understanding of the mechanisms underlying the emergence and diffusion of crime is very limited, particularly when quantitative models are consid...
Collective signaling for a quorum is found in a wide range of organisms that face collective action problems whose successful solution requires the participation of some quorum of the individuals present. These range from humans, to social insects, to bacteria. The mechanisms involved, the quorum required, and the size of the group may vary. Here we address the general question of the evolution of collective si...
Global coordination for the preservation of a common good, such as climate, is one of the most prominent challenges of modern societies. In this manuscript, we use the framework of evolutionary game theory to investigate whether a polycentric structure of multiple small-scale agreements provides a viable solution to solve global dilemmas as climate change governance. We review a stochastic model which incorpora...
Case study and model results lend some optimism for the potential of small coalitions with partially excludable public goods to substantially deepen international cooperation on energy and climate issues. Drawing motivation from other issue areas in international relations ranging from nuclear non-proliferation, transboundary air pollution and liberalized trade, we use an evolutionary-game-theoretic model to an...
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